Network Design White Papers

Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks

Overview Lack of cooperation free riding is one of the key problems that confront nowadays P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges the authors' model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD), and proposes the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fully distributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflow-based subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, the author shows that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.

Further White Paper Details
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery File FormatPDF
Date PublishedMay 2004
FormatWhite Papers   
Topics

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