Network Design White Papers
Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks
Overview Lack of cooperation free riding is one of the key problems that confront nowadays P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges the authors' model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD), and proposes the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fully distributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflow-based subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, the author shows that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery | File Format | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Date Published | May 2004 | ||
| Format | White Papers | ||
| Topics | |||



