Financial Management White Papers
Co-Ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures
Overview This paper studies a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. In the face of sovereign default, the need to give appropriate incentives to the debtor leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors. The paper discusses how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures - involving increased 'contractibility' of sovereign debtor's pay-offs, suspension of convertibility in a 'discovery' phase and penalties in case of malfeasance.
| Publisher | University of Warwick | File Format | PDF, requires Acrobat Rdr 5 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Date Published | November 2002 | Downloads | 3 |
| Format | White Papers | ||
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